Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

West Valley Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4, a
non-profit Utah corporation, and Jim Crowley v.
Dennis Nordfelt, West Valley Chief of Police, and
West Valley Civil Service Commission : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jerrald D. Conder; Peter L. Rognlie; Conder & Wangsgard; Attorneys for Appellants.
Paul T. Morris; West Valley City Attorney; J. Richard Catten; Assistant City Attorney; Attorneys for
Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, West Valley Fraternal Order v. Nordfelt, No. 920276 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3213

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

TAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
t .H
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO,

3102?^

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WEST VALLEY CITY FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4, a
non-profit Utah corporation,
and JIM CROWLEY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
-vs-

Appellate No. 920276-CA

DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
Chief of Police, and WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Priority Classification 16

Defendants/Appellees.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from final order entered in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis,
presiding.

Paul T. Morris, Esq. (3738)
West Valley City Attorney
J. Richard Catten, Esq. (4291)
Assistant City Attorney
3636 South 2700 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Attorneys for Defendants/
Appellees

Jerrald D. Conder, Esq. (0709)
Peter L. Rognlie, Esq. (4131)
CONDER & WANGSGARD
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Appellants

DEC 91992

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WEST VALLEY CITY FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4, a
non-profit Utah corporationf
and JIM CROWLEY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
-vs-

Appellate No. 92G276-CA

DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
Chief of Police, and WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Priority Classification 16

Defendants/Appellees.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from final order entered in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis,
presiding.

Paul T. Morris, Esq. (3738)
West Valley City Attorney
J. Richard Catten, Esq. (4291)
Assistant City Attorney
3636 South 2700 West
West Valley Cityr Utah 84119
Attorneys for Defendants/
Appellees

Jerrald D. Conder, Esq. (0709)
Peter L. Rognlie, Esq. (4131)
CONDER & WANGSGARD
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Appellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

ARGUMENTS:
I.

IN THEIR OPENING BRIEF APPELLANTS MARSHALED
THE EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF FACT. . 1

II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS

5

III. EVEN ASSUMING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST DO EXIST,
F.O.P. HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION IN ITS
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY

13

IV.

CROWLEY HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION

16

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE APPELLATE
STANDING TEST

17

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
JOINDER

19

VI.

CONCLUSION

20

ADDENDUM (and Table of Contents for Addendum)

22

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Child v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commissionf
759 F.2d 565 (C.A. 6th, 1985)
."
18
Gillis v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 759
F.2d 565 (C.A. 6th 1985)
14-15
Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d 59, 21 Utah 2d 242 (1968). . 8, 9,
10,15,
17
Lee v. Provo City Civil Service Commission, 582 P.2d 485
(Utah 1978)
18
Love v. U.S., 871 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1989)
12
McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977). 8
Moir v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 895
F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990)
12
R.I. Chapter, Association of General Contractors v.,
Kreps, 450 F.Supp. 338 (D.Ct.R.I. 1978)
13-14
Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d
1166 (Utah 1987)
11,16,
18,19
Utah Restraunt Association v. Davis County Board of
Health, 709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985)
15,16

Procedural Rules:
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1988)
Rule 19, Utah Supreme Court Rules, (1987)

18,19
18

Statutes and Rules:
Utah Code Ann. , § 10-3-1010 (1983)
Rule 1-6, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988). .
Rule III-l, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988)

ii

5
8
6

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WEST VALLEY CITY FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4, a
non-profit Utah corporationf
and JIM CROWLEY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants ,
-vs-

Appellate No. 920276-CA

DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
Chief of Police, and WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Priority Classification 16

Defendants/Appellees.
Appellants, West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge
#4 and Jim Crowley, will reply herein to certain of the arguments
raised by Appellees in their brief:
ARGUMENT
I.

IN THEIR OPENING BRIEF APPELLANTS
MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE THAT
SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiffs, in sections II. A. and III. A. of their opening
brief, satisfied this court's marshaling requirement by presenting the array of evidence presented to the trial court in conjunction with defendants1 Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiffs specifically challenged findings nos. 2, 3, 4, 7,
8, 10 and 11. Plaintiffs marshaled the evidence supporting those

findings and then supported their argument that those findings
were erroneous, in part by pointing out that the trial court
disregarded
330-369]

the affidavits supplied by plaintiffs [R.229-232,

despite

their

being

specifically

incorporated

into

Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum In Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss

[R.345] and plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in

Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder [R.341].
For example, finding of fact number 2 was challenged by
plaintiffs because it was the trial court's springboard to the
conclusion

that

seniority

promotion

examination

was

properly

process.

considered

Defendants,

in

in

the

arguing

plaintiffs' failure to marshal the evidence in support of finding
number 2, fail to recognize that the only relevance this finding
has to the case is in regard to the question of whether seniority
was adequately

considered.

As such, the additional evidence

defendants claim was not included in plaintiffs' opening brief
regarding

the

one

year

probationary

period

serves

only

to

establish the logical requirement that officers complete their
probation before being promoted and is merely cumulative to the
evidence marshaled by plaintiffs.

The length of the probationary

period is not an issue in this case.
properly

considered

is

an

issue

Whether seniority was

raised

by

plaintiffs, and

plaintiffs have demonstrated that finding number 2 is flawed both
because it is clearly contradicted and because it cannot support
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the trial court's legal conclusion that seniority was adequately
considered.

See Appellants' Opening Brief at 22-23.

In regard to findings of fact numbers 3 and 4, defendants
conveniently

ignore the

fact that the thrust of plaintiffs'

attack on those findings is that they fail to acknowledge that
Chief Nordfelt and Guy Kimball recognized that P.O.I officers
were not allowed to participate in the promotion examination
process and then acted improperly to waive "the restriction in
the Civil Service requirements stating that officers applying for
the position of Sergeant be of a POII rank, be waived."

[R.110].

Plaintiffs' challenges to findings numbers 3 and 4 are directed
at what was omitted from those, and indeed allf of the trial
court's findings and the fact that the findings only reflect the
status of the facts after the illegal waiver obtained by Chief
Nordfelt and Guy Kimball on June 6, 1989.

[R.110].

Given the

specific nature of plaintiffs' challenges to findings 3 and 4,
plaintiffs

have adequately marshaled

support them.
Plaintiffs

See Appellants' Opening Brief at 23-24.
adequately

findings numbers 7 and 8.
36-39.

the facts that tend to

marshaled

the

evidence

supporting

See Appellants' Opening Brief at pp.

With respect to finding number 7, defendants point to

supporting factual references that are not included in plaintiffs' original discussion of the evidence, but plaintiffs submit
that should not be fatal to plaintiffs' challenge of or dispositive of the verity of finding no. 7.
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In light of plaintiffs'

claims that he was improperly required to compete against ineligible candidates and that his seniority was not considered, the
fact Crowley failed the written examination by one point cannot
properly be found to be the sole reason why Crowley "...did not
proceed further in the promotional process."

[R.432].

As to

finding number 8f defendants fail to call the court's attention
to any substantial evidence absent from plaintiffs1 marshaling
effort other than that discussed with respect to finding 7.

The

"threshhold qualification" of a completed probation does not, as
defendants argue, equate with proper consideration of seniority.
Plaintiffs clearly demonstrated why finding nuraber 8 is fatally
flawed.

See Appellants1 Opening Brief at pp. 38-39.

Plaintiffs also sufficiently marshaled the evidence that
tends to support findings numbers 10 and 11.

Defendants1 brief

acknowledges that plaintiffs properly marshaled the evidence that
tends to support finding number 11, and with respect to finding
number 10, defendants suggest only that plaintiffs should have
reinterated the evidence that tends to support the trial courts'
findings with respect to the seniority and the improper waiver of
the P.O.II requirement.
Plaintiffs presented the evidence before the trial court
that tends to support the trial court's findings of fact and
thereby satisfied this court's marshaling requirement.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF
FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS

The only finding of fact made by the trial court that even
remotely addresses the issue of the consideration of the candidates1 seniority was finding of fact number 2 which states:
One year of service with the West Valley City Police
Department was required in order to be eligible for
promotion for Sergeant. [R.432]
The requirement that candidates "must be off probation" was a
minimum qualification, as stated in the June 6, 1989 memorandum:
Must have four years of police experience (plus
two additional years police experience if
substituting for college).
Must have two years of college (two years police
experience can be substituted)•
Must be off probation.
Must have above average performance evaluation.
[R.006].

The length of the probationary period is not an issue

in this case.

Plaintiffs challenge finding number 2 because it

is patently erroneous insofar as the trial court used it to
support the legal conclusion that seniority was properly considered.
Plaintiffs allege that the candidates1 seniority in service
was not considered as required by Utah Code Ann., § 10-3-1010
(1983), which states in pertinent part:
The civil service commission shall provide for promotion in the classified civil service on the basis of
ascertained merit, seniority in service and standing
obtained
by
competitive
examination....(emphasis
added.)
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Rule 111-1/ W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988)r similarly states:
The Commission shall provide for promotion in the Civil
Service on the basis of ascertained merit/ seniority in
service and standing obtained by competitive examination. ...(emphasis added.)
While defendants

go to great

lengths

to establish

that the

probationary period was one year# they present no evidence that
minimum qualification was intended to be consideration of seniority.

Neither the June 6f 1989 nor the July 7, 1989 memoranda

make any reference to consideration of seniority.

There is no

evidence to indicate that seniority was considered.
The trial court/ however, presumably determined seniority
was considered when it concluded F.O.P. and Crowley did not
suffer injury related to the conduct of defendants and therefore
had no standing.

To the extent the trial court and defendants

relied on finding number 2 to support the conclusion that seniority was properly considered/ it is clearly erroneous.
Findings of fact numbers 3 and 4 state:
[3:] The requirements for promotion to sergeant
required that applicants hold the rank of police
officer within the West Valley City Police Department.
[R.432]
[4:] Within the rank of police officer, all grades
(P.O.I/ P.O.II and P.O.Ill) were eligible for promotion
to sergeant/ with no grade preference given to the
members of any one grade [R.432].
The

controversy

regarding

findings

numbers

3

and

4 is

caused/ in partf by the variable uses and meanings ascribed to
the term "rank" by the parties.

Even Chief Nordfelt and Guy

Kimball/ however/ within the specific context of the promotional
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evaluation at issue here, referred to P.O.II as a designation of
"rank."
para.

[R.110

2, lines

(June 6, 1989 memorandum at para. 1, line 5;
2, 7)].

While

defendants

now

differentiate

between "rank" and "grade," it is clear that they did not do so
when they committed the acts plaintiffs complain of.

The remain-

der of the controversy regarding findings 3 and 4 stems from the
trial courtfs apparent failure to consider plaintiffs1 allegation
that Chief Nordfelt and Guy Kimball illegally waived the requirement that candidates be at least P.O.II officers in order to be
eligible for promotion to sergeant.

Although the illegal P.O.II

waiver issue is one of the two principal improprieties plaintiffs
alleged occurred in the design and administration of the promotion evaluation, it is not directly addressed in the trial
court's findings and conclusions.

Like the issue of seniority,

consideration of the illegal waiver of the P.O.II requirement is
necessary to a fair determination of whether F.O.P. and Crowley
had standing.

For that reason plaintiffs have challenged the

findings that most closely approach the facts that bear on the
P.O.II issue, findings 3 and 4.
The
required

clearest

evidence

that

candidates

were

initially

to be P.O.II officers comes from the June 6, 1989

request for waiver Chief Nordfelt addressed to the Commission
which states:
The Police Department is considering offering a Sergeant's test to establish a promotional roster for that
rank.
As a result of this, we request that the
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restriction in the Civil Service requirements stating
that officers applying for the position of Sergeant be
of P.O.II rank, be waived.
...Therefore, since the reasons for these officers not
reaching the rank of P.O. II qualifying them for the
Sergeant test is due to the Department's inability to
offer such a position to themf we respectfully request
that the Civil Service Board waive this restriction for
the testing.
[R.110].

See also Chief Nordfeltfs August 16, 1990 deposition

testimony quoted at R. 293-295 (Addendum at A-C) .

On that same

day, Guy Kimball approved the request by his signature on the
letter [R 110, 117, 294-95].

The P.O.II requirement was thereby

waived by a single Commissioner and without the benefits of the
other

Commissions1

deliberation

or

a

hearing

of

any

kind.

Obviously, both Chief Nordfelt and Guy Kimball recognized that
P.O.I officers were not eligible for promotion to sergeant.

Guy

Kimball, as Chairman of the Commission, is the best source of
interpretation
adopted

for the rules and requirements

pursuant

to

statute.

See

McPhie

Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977).
by

Chief

Nordfelt

and

Guy

Kimball was

the Commission
v.

Industrial

The waiver effected
illegal.

Rule

1-6,

W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988); Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d 59, 61, 21
Utah2d 242

(1968).

F.O.P. and Crowley suffered distinct and

palpable injury when P.O.I officers illegally became eligible to
compete in the evaluation process, and that injury is part of the
basis for F.O.P. 's and Crowley's standing in this case.

To the

extent findings 3 and 4 fail to acknowledge the illegal waiver of
the P.O.II requirement, they are clearly erroneous.
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Plaintiffs submit that finding of fact number 7 is also
clearly erroneous when it is examined in light of plaintiffs1
claims that Crowley was required to compete against ineligible
candidates and that his seniority was not considered.

Finding

number 7 states:
Plaintiff Jim Crowley did not receive the minimum
required passing score on the written examination and,
therefore, did not proceed further in the promotional
process [R.432].
Crowley's failure, by one point, to pass the written examination
portion of the evaluation does not support the trial courts1
conclusion that Crowley was not injured and therefore did not
have standing.

Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d at 60. In addition,

because ineligible candidates were allowed to compete and seniority was not considered, plaintiffs submit Crowley's score on the
written examination is irrelevant, and a new examination should
be given.

Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d at 60. The primary flaw

in finding number 7 is the statement that the written examination
is the reason Crowley did not proceed further in the promotional
process.

That conclusion assumes the evaluation process was

properly designed and administered and in so doing it ignores the
very nature of Crowley's action.

It is therefore clear errone-

ous.
Finding number 8 states:
Plaintiff Jim Crowley did not suffer a distinct,
particularized and palpable injury related to the
conduct of Defendants [R.432].
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Plaintiffs' discussion of findings of fact numbers 2, 3 and 4,
supra, and Point IV, infra, establishes that the trial court did
not consider the nature of Crowley's claims or the evidence
supporting those claims when it determined that Crowley was not
injured

by defendants' actions.

Crowley was

injured by the

failure to consider his seniority and by being found to compete
with ineligible candidates.

It was improper for the trial court

to ignore those claims based solely on Crowley's test score.
Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d at 60. Crowley was injured when he
was not afforded a fair opportunity for promotion, and to the
extent finding 8 states he was not, it is clearly erroneous.
Defendants misquote finding number 10. See Appellees' Brief
at p. 26.

It states:

Members of the F.O.P. did not suffer distinct,
particularized and palpable injury related to the
conduct of Defendants. [R.433].
As with finding number 8, finding number 10 is clearly erroneous
because it fails to address the seniority and eligibility issues
raised by plaintiffs and discussed more fully in appellants'
opening brief and in conjunction with findings of fact 2, 3 and 4,
supra.

There is no evidence

in the record

to indicate the

candidates' seniority was considered in the evaluation process.
Defendants made the disingenuous assertion that because candidates were required to be off probation, their seniority was
considered.
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The one year of probationary service cannot substitute for
proper consideration of each candidate's relative seniority in
service.

Defendants

also cannot escape

the

fact that Chief

Nordfelt and Guy Kimball illegally waived the requirement that
candidates be at least P.O.II officers in order to be eligible
for promotion to sergeant.
P.O.II requirement exists
[R.110, 117, 293-95].

The unimpeachable evidence that the
in provided

by the waiver itself.

There would have been no need to waive

that requirement if it did not exist. The trial court overlooked
the injuries - the seniority and eligibility issues - when it
adopted finding number 10.
Plaintiffs submit that finding of fact number 11 is clearly
erroneous, and because the Society of Professional Journalists v.
Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah 1987), appellate standing test
does not apply, that it is irrelevant.

It states:

Plaintiff F.O.P. did not present its claims to the
Civil Service Commission prior to the commencement of
this lawsuit. [R. 433].
The

fatal error of finding number

11 is amply discussed in

appellants' opening brief and at point V, infra.

The portions of

Cory Ervin's affidavit [R.186] upon which defendants rely does
not cancel the allegations and clear documentary evidence plaintiffs have presented [R. 10-12, 13, 110, 116, 332, 335, 338-39].
Plaintiffs

have

argued

that

the

Commissions

rules

and

regulations did not provide a means for Department officers to
object to improprieties in the promotion examination process. In
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their attempt to counter this argumentf defendants first misconstrue it.

In their opening brief, plaintiffs argued, ". .. the

Commissions1 rules and regulations did not provide a process..."
See Appellants1 Opening Brief at 27.

That statement is true.

The West Valley City Civil Service Policy and Procedures Manual
contains no rules addressing officers' rights to seek review of
the promotion examination process.

Without Commission rules to

guide them, the F.O.P. officers, including Crowley, presented
their claims to the Commission as best they could.

Appellees

brief recognizes that fact.

"...The 30 officers who signed the

August

did

23,

1989

letter

successfully

bring

alleged

improprieties to the Commission and received a response from the
Commission following the Commissions1 investigation.1

Appellees1

Brief at p.29.
It is clear the trial court did not adequately consider the
claims raised by F.O.P. and Crowley when it determined that
neither F.O.P. nor Crowley
defendants1

conduct.

suffered

injuries as a result of

For that reason, plaintiffs submit that

this court should conduct a de novo review of the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiffs' claims.

See, Moir v. Greater Cleveland

Regional Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990); Love
v, U.S., 871 F.2d

1488

(9th Cir. 1989).

The trial courts'

findings of fact numbers 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10 and 11 are clearly
erroneous and should be reversed.
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III.

EVEN ASSUMING CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST DO EXIST, F.O.P. HAS
STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION
IN IT'S REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY.

Even if it is assumed, arguendo/ that conflicts of interest
exist between individual F.O.P. members, those conflicts do not
preclude F.O.P.'s standing.

This is particularly true in this

case where, as previously argued by plaintiffs, the "diverse
interests11, as they are characterized by defendants, stem primarily from the unfair advantage conferred upon three F.O.P. members
because of the improper and illegal design and administration of
the promotion examination process.

R.I. Chapter, Association of

General Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F.Supp. 338 (D.Ct.R.I. 1978),
discussed in appellants1 opening brief, makes it clear that an
association need not adequately represent the interests of any
association members who receive advantage

or benefit by the

illegal or improper acts complained of and that absence of injury
to some members or discrepancies between the injuries suffered by
an association's members
standing.

are not fatal to the association's

The court stated:

Although one contractor member was awarded a contract
upon satisfaction of the 10 percent requirement, the
possible absence of economic injury to him with regard
to this one project, out of a possible twenty, does not
destroy the Contractor Associations' standing to seek
generalized relief....
Any conflict among competing Contractor Association
members over the Pawtucket project does not affect the
standing of this Association to assert the rights of
injured members. The Association does not function
like a class representative, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4), as
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defendants suggest. It need not adequately represent
the interest of the member who won the Pawtucket
contract. That member can intervene to represent his
own interests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24 without the
showing of inadequate representation required under
Rule 23(d). The suit by the Association has the same
effect on this member's rights as would any facial
attack brought by single contractor on his own behalf,
(citation omitted).
R.I. Chapter, 450 F.Supp. 338 at 347 n.3.
Defendants'

assertion

that

the

ruled to the contrary is incorrect.

courts

found

that

an

association

consistently

In Gillis v. U.S. Dept. of

Health and Human Services, 759 F.2d 565
court

have

(C.A. 6th 1985) , the

of nursing

home residents,

hospital patients, patients' relatives and health care professionals had standing to claim that the Department of Health and
Human Services had

failed

to ensure that hospitals properly

fulfilled their obligations under the Hill-Burton Act to provide
services without charge or at reduced charges to eligible patients.

Rejecting the argument that the association's members1

interests were "...too diverse and the possibilities of conflict
too obvious to make the association an appropriate vehicle to
litigate the claims of its members,"

Gillis, 759 F.2d at 572

(quoting Associated General Contractors v. Ottertail Power Co.,
611 P.2d 684, 691 (8th Cir. 1979)), the court stated:
Although there is a theoretical conflict between
...[the association's] members posited by HHS, it would
not seem to be the type that should deprive an association of representational standing.
See National
Constructions Ass'n v. National Electrical Contractors
Assn., 498 F.Supp. 510, 520-21 (D.Md. 1980). First the
adverse effects to certain members of the relief being
Page -14

sought are both speculative and indirect. Second, once
an organization has alleged actual injury to 'its
members, or any one of them', Warth v. Sedlin, 422 U.S.
at 511, 95 S.Ct. at 2211 (emphasis added), it may argue
on behalf of the 'public interest'. Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. at 737-38, 92 S.Ct. at 1367-68.
Virtually any relief involving the expenditure of money
that benefits some but not all of an organization's
members potentially means that money will be unavailable to or in part exacted from the remainder of the
membership. By joining an organization dedicated to a
particular goal in the public interest, members indicate a willingness to make certain sacrifices productive of that goal. Carried to its logical extreme,
evaluation of representational standing in terms of the
adverseness of remote interests of discrete members
would seriously undermine the ability of individuals
through organizations to achieve public interest
objectives through the system. CjE. NCAA v. Califano,
622 F.2d 1382, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1980) (where one or
more members of association support bringing suit,
association has standing absent showing that more
members oppose than support associations position).
Gillis, 759 F.2d at 572-73.

Where, as here, the charge before

the court is that classified civil service employees have lost
the protections afforded by the merit system that governs their
employment, the "public interest" is at issue.
The reasons for the adoption of a merit system are to
protect employees and the public from the evils of the
spoils system and to assure to each officer an orderly
opportunity for promotion. (emphasis added.)
Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d at 61. Furthermore, the individual
participation

of

individual

F.O.P.

members

is

not

required

because appellants have not requested monetary damages.

Utah

Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d
1159, 1163 (Utah 1985) .
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Appellees claim the most dramatic example of conflict is the
fact that Chief Nordfelt was an F.O.P. member when the case was
filed.

Chief Nordfelt, however, resigned

F.O.P. on October 3, 1991 [R.408-410

his membership

(Addendum at D-F) ] .

in
The

fact that Chief Nordfelt was once a member of F.O.P. does not
create a conflict that should now prevent F.O.P. from having
standing in this case.
Any conflicts among F.O.P. members that may exist are not of
the kind that prevent F.O.P. from meeting the cissociation standing test first enunciated in Utah Restaurant Associationf 709
P.2d at 1163 and Society of Professional Journalists, 743 P.2d at
1170.

IV.

CROWLEY HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION

Defendants' primary argument in support of their contention
that Crowly did not have standing is that Crowley suffered no
injury and therefore has no personal stake in the outcome of the
dispute.

In making that argument, defendants ignore the nature

of the factual support for the injuries Crowley has alleged.
Crowley alleged that he was improperly required to compete
against ineligible candidates holding only the P.O.I rank [R.
113-118, 338] and that his approximately nine years of seniority
was not considered in the promotion process as required by law
[R. 6-9f 113-118, 338]. In addition, Crowley alleged the Commission was illegally constituted on October 4, 1989, when the
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officers1 complaints were summarily dismissed by the Commission,
and that candidates were not allowed

equal access

materials

[R.

to

Crowley's

injuries

10-13,

117].

are

not

Contrary
merely

grievances shared by the public.

to study

defendants'

generalized

claim,

interests

or

Furthermore, defendants have

falsely stated that the quote from Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d
59, 60, 21 Utah2d 242 (1968), provided in appellants' opening
brief at p. 40, suggests Crowley's claims are "an interest shared
by the 'employees and the public."1

Appellees' Brief at p. 38.

The quote provided by plaintiffs does not contain that statement.
In Hayward v. Pennock, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that
every valid participant in a civil service promotional evaluation
is

personally

injured

if

the

evaluation

is

not

conducted

according to state law and commission rule and ruled this was no
less true for applicants who did not pass the written portion of
the

evaluation.

Hayward

v.

Pennock,

444

P.2d

at

60.

As

discussed in Point II, supra, Crowley clearly suffered distinct
and palpable injuries that gave him a personal stake in the
outcome of this case.

Crowley therefore has standing.

The trial

courts' ruling is incorrect and should be reversed.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING
THE APPELLATE STANDING TEST

Defendants argue that the F.O.P.-Crowley Complaint "...is
clearly in the nature of the now abolished writ of mandamus'1
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[Appellees' Brief, p.40], presumably suggesting that the action
was an attempt to obtain an extraordinary writ pursuant to Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 65B (1988) and Utah Supreme Court Rule 19
(1987) .

Based thereon, the trial court required plaintiffs to

meet the appellate standing test stated in Society of Journalists, 743 P.2d

at 1172

[R.434 at para. 6; 435 at para. 9].

Defendants' reliance on Lee v. Provo City Civil Service Commission, 582 P.2d 485 (Utah 1978) and Child v. Salt Lake City Civil
Service Commission, 575 P.2d 195 (Utah 1978) in support of its
argument that "courts have traditionally treated appeals from
decisions of civil service commissions as being governed by Rule
65B" is misplaced.

In both of those cases the officers peti-

tioned the district court for extraordinary writs after they were
discharged from their employment and pursued their appeal rights
with the respective civil service commissions.

Lee and Child

were treated as extraordinary writ cases because that is how they
were initiated.

They were not converted into extraordinary writ

proceedings as defendants argue is appropriate here.
case

differs

attempted

factually

and

procedurally

because

to get the Civil Service Commission

The instant
plaintiffs

to adequately

address their concerns despite the fact that the Commission's
rules did not specifically provide for review of the promotion
examination process.
Commission

[R.10-12, 116, 332, 335, 339]. When the

summarily dismissed

the issues raised, F.O.P. and
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Crowley then filed a direct action.

The Society of Journalists

appellate standing test simply does not apply in this case.
Defendants in effect concede that the Commission considered
the claims raised by F.O.P., but incorrectly assert that the
Commission's ruling was not adverse to F.O.P. (Appellees' Brief
at p. 41.)

F.O.P. officers and Crowley initially brought their

concerns to the attention of the Commission by letter dated
August 23, 1989

[R. 10-12, 116, 332, 335, 339].

Those alle-

gations were summarily dismissed by the October 4, 1989 letter
signed by Commissioners Guy Kimball and Don Meyers [R. 113, 116].
A copy of that letter was delivered to an F.O.P. representative
[R. 116] .

Even if it was appropriate to apply the appellate

standing test to plaintiffs in this case, F.O.P. and Crowley have
met that test.

Both F.O.P. and Crowley had standing to bring

their claims before the Commission.
before

the

Commission

and

they

They brought those claims

received

an

adverse

ruling.

Defendants cannot escape the fact that the Commission produced an
adverse response to the officers' claims [R. 13].
Plaintiffs did not initiate this action under the authority
of Rule 65B.

The trial court erred in applying the appellate

standing test and in determining that plaintiffs had not satisfied that test.

VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DENYING THE MOTION FOR JOINDER

Defendants misperceive the nature of the relief sought by
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plaintiffs

in regard

to the motion

for

joinder.

On appeal

plaintiffs have requested that the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction rulings be reversed.

If rulings are reversed and

plaintiffs are found to have had standing in the court below, it
necessarily follows that the motion for joinder was not moot and
should have been granted.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs respectfully submit
that the trial court's rulings with respect to F.O.P.'s and
Crowley's standing be reversed, that the dismissal based on lack
of standing be reversed and that the case be remanded back to the
District

Court

for

trial

with

direction

to

allow

proposed

co-plaintiffs Shopay and Salmon to join the action.
DATED this

J

day of December, 1992.
CONDER & WANGSGARD:

C
N.

Jerrkld £>T Cundei ^
Pe£er L. Rognlie
—ff£torney for Plaintiffs/
Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

certify that on December
served two (2) copies of the attached Appellants1 Reply Brief upon
J.

Richard

Catten, Assistant

City Attorney,

counsel

for the

appellees in this matter by mailing them to him by first-class
mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
Catten, Esq.
attorney
Blvd.
', UT /64119

iter L. Roorilie
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Appellants
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ADDENDUM
Table of Contents

Page

Chief Nordfelt*s Agust 16, 1990 deposition
testimony [R. 293-255]

A-C

William Salmon Affidavit re: Conflict of Interest,
including October 3, 1991 letter of Chief Nordfelt
[R. 408-410]

D-F
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Defendants now argue in their memorandum that the Civil
Service Commission did not waive a requirement to sit for the
sergeant's examination.

This disengenuous argument misleads the

court and ignores the facts and documents on record which have
been provided in discovery.
On August 16, 1990, Chief Dennis Nordfelt was deposed.

The

questions and responses regarding the requested waiver of the
POII requirement are as follows:
Q. (BY MR. BENNETT) Chief, I hand you what has been marked
as Exhibit 2 and ask you to examine that.
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell us what that is?
A. This is a memorandum that was sent under my signature,
my name, to the Civil Service Commission requesting a waiver for
the sergeant's test.
Q. Did you prepare this letter, this memorandum?
A. Probably not. I probably directed either one of my
staff or my administrative assistant to give them the content and
said, "Write me a memo to the Civil Service Commission."
Q. You don't recall specifically who that would have been?
A. No.
Q. Can you tell us what problem it is addressing?
A. Yes. The previous requirement to become a candidate for
sergeant had been and were at the time that an officer to be
POII, a police officer 2. However, because of budgetary problems, there had been several officers in the office that were
qualified, otherwise qualified to be POII's and should have been,
but we had not been given the money in our budget to allow it to
occur.
So other then penalize them over something which they had no
control over, where they would otherwise be qualified had the
money been in the budget, it was my opinion that they should be
allowed to compete for the rank of sergeant.
Q. Can you recall how this problem came to your attention
about th POI, POII requirements?
A. No.
Q. In the usual coi^rse of your duties, how would such a
problem usually come to your attention?
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A. Well, believe it or not sometimes I pick up on something
like that.
Q. Every once in a while?
A. Every once in a while. Sometimes members of my staff,
sometimes the personnel department, sometimes Mr, Catten. Quite
often it comes from someone who is affected by this kind of a
problem.
Q. This particular instance you don't recall how it came to
your attention?
A. I do not.
Q. But you directed the letter to be prepared or it was
just somehow generated after you and your staff became aware of
the problem?
A. My recollection is that I was aware of the problem and I
directed a memo to the Civil Service Commission.
Q. It's dated June 6th of 1989?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell us what the mechanics were in getting this
thing to the Civil Service Commission, this letter?
A. As far as my mechanics were, it was to be put in my out
tray after I had reviewed it.
Q. Now, this exhibit doesn't bear your signature, does it?
A. No.
Q. That's not unusual for a memorandum though, is it?
A. No, it is not.
Q. When something goes in your out tray and in particular
this document, what do you expect to have happen to it?
A. I expect that it would be delivered to the Civil Service
Commission. My guess is this was given to Cory, who is in the
personnel department, who is the secretary to the Civil Service
Commission. That is generally what happens with communications
to the Civil Service Commission unless we mail them, which I
don't think we have ever done. I think it would always go to
Cory and she would probably distribute them to the Civil Service
Commission.
Q. Now, the copy that we have has some handwriting down at
the bottom?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you read what that says?
A. No.
Q. It seems to contain a date, doesn't it?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. What is that date?
A. It looks to me like it's the 6th of June, 1989.
Q. Did you see this memorandum returned to you after it had
this writing put on it?
A. I don't recall.
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Q. Are you familiar with the — and I can't read it either
and I am not familiar with the signatures.
A. As I look at it, I don't know whose it is.
Q. Who do you think it is?
A. I believe it's Guy Kimball.
Q. The first word on the first line, does that not appear
to be the word approved?
A. Yes.
Q. So as best we can make out it says "approved 6-6-89, Guy
Kimball"?
Nordfelt

Deposition,

pp.

30-34.

It

is

clear

from

Chief

Nordfelt's own sworn testimony that there was a requirement that
any officer sitting for the sergeant's exam be a POII officer
with one year's experience.

Chief Nordfelt acknowledged that

requirement and, in fact, requested to have it waived.
Guy Kimball, Chairman of the West Valley City Civil Service
Commission, was deposed on August 16, 1990.

In that deposition

(at pp. 5-6, attached here'to as Exhibit "A") Mr. Kimball indicated that he read and signjed the memorandum
Exhibit

"B")

discussed

in

Chief

(attached hereto as

Nordfelt's

deposition.

In

addition, the Civil Service document provided by counsel in
discovery (attached hereto as Exhibit "C") identifies the Civil
Service requirements to sit for the sergeant's examination.
There is no genuine issue that the Department and the Civil
Service Commission required those sitting for the sergeant's exam
to be of the rank of POII.

The argument made by defendants is

patently false and it not asserted in good faith.

Because this

argument violates Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P., plaintiffs request that
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Jerrald D. Conder (#0709)
K. C. Bennett (#3700)
Of CONDER & WANGSGARD
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, UT 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500

BY.

/v

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and William Salmon and David Shopay
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY CITY FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4, a
non-profit Utah corporation,
and JIM CROWLEY,

'
\

AFFIDAVIT RE: CONFLICT
OF INTEREST

Plaintiffs,
-vsCivil No. 89-0907667 CV
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
Chief of Police, and WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

i

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE :
STATE OF UTAH

:

William Salmon, under oath, deposes and states:
1.

All statements made herein are based on my own personal

knowledge and information.
2.

I am the recording secretary of West Valley Fraternal

Order of Police Lodge #4.

O0408

K

3.

On October 3, 1991, I received the resignation of Chief

Dennis J. Nordfelt as a member of our organization.

(a copy of

that resignation is attached).
4.

Chief Dennis Nordfelt!s name has been stricken from the

membership roles of West Valley Fraternal Order of Police Lodge
#4 effective October 3, 1991.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this ^ ~

day of October, 1991.

Willi am/S almon
/

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3$

day of October,

1991.

NOTARY PUBLIC
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

30

day of October, 1991, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT RE: CONFLICT OF
INTEREST

was

mailed,

first-class,

postage

prepaid,

to

the

following counsel of record:
J. Richard Catten
Assistant City Attorney
3600 South 2700 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119
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West Valley City

POLICE'DEPARTMENT

^2

M E M O R A N D U M

TO:

Officer Jim Crowley.

F.O.P. President

FROM:

Ohior Dennis J. Nor-if* it

DATE:
SUBJECT:

F.O.P. MEMBERSHIP

After due consi^eiat ion.
hove come to. the eor.clusivri "thst"'7 can better Srrvve
the. members f th~ Dep6i*tin.-r;t bv not beina c:
member -:f * >,.- Fi'r.t rvna 1 •>••>.• o: f-.«: ice.
T'here:..» e . T .;.m
resigning my mTiribersiilp in the
. e r t e o t i ve ..: me cs i s t e iv .
. 0. conoumma^e this >*e::ian3t ion
any addition*.J action' is-t... •« ..
f
please ud\'-se me.
It is my desire
harmor-v. sr.d I • O.-K
cc:

:n

CJIiliiPJiv

tO

11

WOl

forward to

K a r e n Lef tvn ch . C i t v Man-err

. 3600 Constitution Blvd.

West Valley City, Utah 84119-3720

Phone: (801) 966-3600

FAX: (80i) 966-9280.

n(i4i n

J

